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RECENT DECISIONS

or officer is under no duty to disclose any information which he has of those
facts. Waller v. Hodge, 214 Ky, 705, 283 S.W. 1047 (1926) ; Bollstrom v. Duplex
Power Car Co., 208 Mich. 15, 175 N.W. 492 (1919). If a director has knowledge
of a proposed sale of corporate assets which -will enhance the value of the stock,
and such knowledge is not generally available, he is under obligation to disclose
the possibility for the sale to the seller. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 53 L.ed.
853, 29 Sup. Ct. 521 (1908) ; Oliver v. Oliver, supra; Gammon v. Dam, 238 Mich.
30, 212 N.W. 957 (1927). But cf. Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., supra; Bawden v.
Taylor, 254 Ill. 464, 98 N.E. 941 (1912). Of course, if the director or officer
makes actual misrepresentations as to the status of the corporation or is guilty of
actual fraud, he will be held liable to the stockholder. Lightner v. Hill, 258 Mich.
50, 242 N.W. 218 (1932) ; Fisher v. Biedlong, 10 R.I. 525 (1873) ; Black v. Shnpson, 94 S.C. 312, 77 S.E. 1023 (1913) ; Saville v. Sweet, 234 App. Div. 236, 254
N.Y.S. 768 (1932). If a director or officer is questioned by the stockholder and he
falsely denies knowledge affecting the value of the stock, his concealment of
pertinent facts makes him liable. Schroeder v. Carroll, 192 Wis. 460, 212 N.W.
299 (1927). Once a director or officer undertakes to make a disclosure of facts,
whether- such was his duty or not, he is obliged to make full disclosure of all
facts, and his partial concealment of material facts affecting the value of the
stock will subject him to liability. Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va. 310, 92 S.E.
454 (1916) ; see Waller v. Hodge, supra, 283 S.W. 1047, 1050. Where a director
purchases the stock with the view of getting control of the corporation so as
to enable him to sell a majority of the stock to one wishing to purchase some
of the corporation property and thus the director makes a personal profit, he is
liable to the stockholders who sold to him. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust
Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 At]. 77 (1910).
The Wisconsin court adopts neither the majority nor the minority rule, but it
has recognized special circumstances under which relief will be given to the
stockholder who is seeking damages or the return of the stock from the director
or who is seeking a recission of the contract to sell. A trust agreement
was the basis for declaring that a fiduciary relationship existed between the stockholder and director in Bray v. Jones, 190 Wis. 578, 209 N.W. 675 (1926). False
financial statements furnished by the director to the stockholder were sufficient to
give the stockholder relief in McMynn v. Peterson, 186 Wis. 442, 201 N.W. 272
(1925). In the instant case the deposit agreement was made the basis for the
declaration of a fiduciary relationship.
RoBERT J. BuR,
WILLIAm J. Nuss.
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ment of foreclosure was entered against the debtor-mortgagor and the real estat6
encumbered by the mortgage was ordered to be sold. The mortgagor was occupying the premises and conducting thereon a public garage. There were also tenants on the premises occupying a part of the building. After the expiration of
the usual statutory period before sale, the creditor served notice of application
to fix the time and place of the sale, contending that the mortgagor had not paid
the taxes and interest accrued since foreclosure. Thereafter the mortgagor filed a
petition under Section 278.106 [Wis. STAT. (1933)] to secure an additional year in
which to redeem before sale. It appeared that the mortgagor had been collecting
rents from the tenants but that he had paid no accrued taxes or interest. It
appeared, too, that gross income from his business, including rent, was just
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enough to cover expenses without taxes or interest. The circuit court extended
the period to redeem on condition that the mortgagor pay current taxes and
interest. On appeal, held, order reversed; the statutory provision must be construed to mean payment of all accrued taxes or interest or both and not merely
the payment of current taxes accruing during the period of extension. Banking
Contnission of Wisconsin v. Witschel, (Wis. 1935) 263 N.W. 182.
The moratorium statute is emergency legislation. The debtor may be permitted a longer period to redeem than the parties had originally anticipated.
Wis. STAT. (1933) § 278.106; repealed, Wis. Laws (1935) c. 319, § 1. [See Wis.
Laws (1935) c. 482 §. 1 (2) wherein the language is comparable to the language
in § 278.106, supra, and which pertains to the foreclosure of mortgages on real
estate other than homes.] The debtor is not entitled to an extension as a matter
of right. The discretion of the trial court, with reference to the propriety of
granting such extension, is to be exercised in the light of the express purpose
of the statute and particularly that portion of it which sets forth the kind of
showing an applicant must make to the court as a ground for extension. Foelske
v. Stockhausen, 215 Wis. 104, 254 N.W. 349 (1934). While in the instant case
the court's interpretation of the meaning of the language in Section 278.106,
supra, about payment of interest and taxes, may not be literally incontestable,
it is apparent that to interpret this provision as requiring the payment of current
taxes only or interest during the extension would raise a constitutional question. The United States Supreme Court has prescribed the conditions which
must attend generally the carrying out of any state moratorium scheme of this
kind. See Hom'e Bldg. & L. Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444, 54 Sup. Ct. 231,
78 L.ed. 255 (1934). To permit the enforcement of such legislation there must be
some concern on the part of the local courts for the position of the mortgagee.
The scheme must not be one-sided. The state courts must be conscious of the
limitations on the powers of the local legislatures and on their own discretionary
powers as local magistrates. Note .-(1935) 19 MINN. L. REv. 210. The payment
of a stipulated "rental" during the extension period by the mortgagee, when
the court in its discretion fixed the amount of the rental, has been held to be a
valid excercise of discretionary powers under a moratorium law. Union Mntual
Life Co. v. Waddle, 218 Iowa 1367, 257 N.W. 319 (1934). A refusal to grant the
extension if it would hurt the mortgagee's position and confer in fact no benefit
upon the mortgagor is not erroneous. First Nat. Bank of Shakopee v. Hamnnill,
(Minn. 1935) 262 N.W. 160. Where the mortgagor has a substantial equity in
the property and is required to make comparatively moderate monthly payments,
the extension is justified, although the net income from the property is a sum
less than the payments required. Nat. Bank of Aitkin v. Showell, (Minn. 1935)
262 N.W. 689. No extension was granted to a mortgagor who waited until the
regular statutory period for redemption had almost expired before he acted to
obtain further time to redeem, when it was shown that income obtained during
the regular period of redemption was not applied on the mortgage indebtedness
or accrued taxes. Tuxedo Enterprises v. Detroit Trust Co., 272 Mich. 160, 261
N.W. 283 (1935). A failure to show on an application for an extension what
she had done with insurance money received after the death of her husband was
enough to bar a wife from obtaining the extension. Foelske v. Stockhausen,
supra. If the extension as ordered by the circuit court had been confirmed the
mortgagee's interest would not have been adequately protected. The property was
bringing some return to the debtor. It was not homestead property. The unpaid
taxes of 1932 and 1933 would remain as an encumbrance on the property which
would endanger the mortgagee's security without some further investment on
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his part. It is submitted that the decision of the appellate court is consistent
with the constitutional limitations which do very definitely affect the administration of relief by the courts under moratorium statutes.
OLIVER H.

PRINCIPAL

AND

SURETY-STATUTORY

BASSUENER.

BONDS-SUBROGATION.-The

petitioner,

a surety company, gave a bond, required by statute, for the protection of materialmen and laborers participating in the drilling of a well for the United States
government. The latter's contracting officer was reguired to retain 10 per cent
of the estimated amount until completion and acceptance of the work. The contractor finished the project, but he did not pay all the materialmen. The surety
paid into court the full amount of its bond, several thousand dollars less than
the contract price and inadequate to satisfy the claims of all materialmen. The
unpaid materialmen seek the retained percentage by virtue of an alleged equity
afforded by statute. The surety, by right of subrogation, lays claim as a general
creditor at least to the same fund for all of it or for a pro rata share. The
contractor having been adjudged a bankrupt, the government turned over the
sum to the trustee to abide the order of the court. The District Court gave priority to the materialmen, which decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals. 75 F. (2d) 377, (C.C.A. 2nd, 1935). On writ of certiorari, held, judgment
affirmed; acquittance under the bond did not leave the surety at liberty to prove
against the assets of the insolvent principal while any materialmen were unpaid.
Anmerican Surety Co. of New York v. Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co., 56 Sup.
Ct. 9 (1935).
Subrogation must be enforced with a due regard to the equitable rights of
others and cannot be invoked to overthrow a superior or equal equity. Fraser v.
Fleming, 190 Mich. 238, 157 N.W. 269 (1916) ; Defiance Machine Works v. Gill,
170 Wis. 477, 175 N.W. 940 (1920). In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. City of
Astoria, 256 Fed. 560 (D.C. Or. 1919), the surety was denied recourse to the
retained. percentages because labor claims were not fully paid. To grant the
surety access to the fund would result in a reduction of the protection of the
bond to the extent of the surety's dividend in the assets of the debtor. Hamill v.
Kuchler, 203 Wis. 414, 234 N.W. 879 (1931). Statutes making mandatory a bond
to insure compensation to materialmen on public contract jobs were enacted as
a substitute for the ordinary materialmen's lien on private jobs. Visconsin Brick
Co. v. National Surety Co., 164 Wis. 585, 160 N.W. 1044 (1917) ; National Surety
Co. v. Bratnober, 67 Wash. 601, 122 Pac. 337 (1912). It is against public policy
that the instrumentalities for carrying on the government should be the subject
of seizure and sale for debt. National Fireproofing Co. v. Huntington, 81 Conn.
632, 71 Atl. 911 (1909). The security afforded by the bond has a substantial
tendency to lower the prices at which labor and material will be furnished. See
Equitable Surety Co. v. McMullan, 234 U. S. 448, 34 Sup. Ct. 803, 58 L.ed. 1394
(1914). It has been held traditionally that a material alteration of a contract
without the consent of the surety discharges the latter. Woodruff v. Schultc, 155
XMich. 11, 118 N.W. 579, 16 Ann. Cas. 346 (1908) ; Lonergan v. San Antonio Loan
Co., 101 Tex. 63, 104 S.W. 1061, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 364 (1907). And failure of
the owner to retain percentages when required by contract on a private building
project has been deemed a material alteration. Kunz v. Boll, 140 Wis. 69, 121
N.W. 601 (1909). But departures from the contract by the builder are not available to the surety as a defense against the claims of materialmen when they

